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This work studies the behaviors of two large-population teams competing in a discrete environment. The team-level interactions are modeled as a zero-sum game while the agent dynamics within each team is formulated as a collaborative mean-field team problem. Drawing inspiration from the mean-field literature, we first approximate the large-population team game with its infinite-population limit. Subsequently, we construct a fictitious centralized system and transform the infinite-population game to an equivalent zero-sum game between two coordinators. Via a novel reachability analysis, we study the optimality of coordination strategies, which induce decentralized strategies under the original information structure. The optimality of the resulting strategies is established in the original finite-population game, and the theoretical guarantees are verified by numerical examples. 

We present a framework that incorporates the principle of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is generally characterized by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form, whose calculation may require extensive computational resources. In this paper, the agents are modeled as bounded rational entities with limited computational capabilities. We illustrate the proposed framework by applying it to a pursuit-evasion game between two aerial vehicles in a stochastic wind field. We show how such a game may be discretized and properly analyzed by casting it as an iterative sequence of finite-state Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Leveraging tools and algorithms from the cognitive hierarchy theory (“level-k thinking”) we compute the solution of the ensuing discrete game, while taking into consideration the rationality level of each agent. We also present an online algorithm for each agent to infer its opponent's rationality level.